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A BAYESIAN PARTIAL IDENTIFICATION APPROACH TO
INFERRING THE PREVALENCE OF ACCOUNTING MISCONDUCT
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Abstract. This paper describes the use of flexible Bayesian regression models for estimat-
ing a partially identified probability function. Our approach permits efficient sensitivity
analysis concerning the posterior impact of priors on the partially identified component of
the regression model. The new methodology is illustrated on an important problem where
only partially observed data is available– inferring the prevalence of accounting misconduct
among publicly traded U.S. businesses.
Keywords: Bayesian inference, nonlinear regression, partial identification, sampling bias,
sensitivity analysis, set identification.
1. Introduction
This paper develops an approach for estimating partially identified parameters in nonlinear
regression settings. Our approach is based on a decomposition of the probability function
into an identified and a partially identified component [Kadane, 1975]. This representation
permits us to employ flexible (nonlinear) models when inferring the identified component; in
our applications we utilize Bayesian tree-based priors for the regression functions [Chipman
et al., 2010, Hill, 2012]. For the partially identified portion of the model, informative priors
are crucial, so checking the sensitivity of posterior inferences to model specification is vital. In
our proposed framework, this sensitivity analysis is straightforward, and may be conducted
under many different models for the partially identified parameters using only one set of
samples from the marginal posterior of the identified parameters.
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Our motivating application comes from the corporate accounting literature, where there is
substantial interest in determining what fraction of U.S. firms engage in financial misconduct
(such as misstated earnings); e.g. Dyck et al. [2013]. Inferring the prevalence of misconduct
is complicated by an inherent partial observability—not all cases of misconduct are discov-
ered. Any treatment of this problem will therefore need to analyze how company attributes
impact the probability of misconduct being discovered in addition to the probability of the
misconduct itself taking place.
As further evidence of the generality of our approach, we also include a reanalysis of a
published dataset (from a broken randomized encouragement study of flu vaccine) in the
supplementary material.
The remainder of this section collects necessary background material, providing an overview
of the concept of partial identification (specifically its treatment from a Bayesian perspec-
tive) and describing the empirical data we will analyze. Section 2 lays out our framework
more generally and fixes notation. Section 3 describes the results of our data analysis.
1.1. Partial identification. A statistical model p(y | τ) indexed by a parameter τ ∈ T
is said to be identifiable or identified if parameter values correspond uniquely to distinct
probability distributions over observables. That is, p(y | τ) = p(y | τ ′) for all y if and only if
τ = τ ′. A model that is not identified is simply referred to as unidentified. The importance
of identifiability as a modeling concern has its earliest roots in econometrics, the term first
being introduced in Koopmans [1949]. Other seminal references include Haavelmo [1943,
1944] and Koopmans and Reiersol [1950]. Unidentifiability arises naturally in econometric
analysis of observational data as a byproduct of imperfect measurement and/or various data
censoring mechanisms. The Bayesian perspective on identifiability has been comprehensively
reviewed in Aldrich [2002] and more recently in San Mart´ın and Gonza´lez [2010].
The notion of partial identifiability or partial identification of parameters expands the
concept of identification to consider cases of partial learning. A more general definition of
identifiability is p(y | τ) = p(y | τ ′) if and only if t(τ) = t(τ ′) for some non-constant function
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t; here t is an “identifying function” in the terminology of Kadane [1975]. When t is one-
to-one, we recover the traditional definition of identifiability, or point identification. When
the t with the finest preimage satisfying this condition is many-to-one, the model is partially
identified — the intuition being that asymptotically we can only isolate the value of t(τ)
consistent with the data, which will correspond to a proper subset of T with more than one
element. For this reason, and in contrast to point identification, it is common to talk of set
identification. For a more rigorous exposition of the theory of functional identification, refer
to Kadane [1975].
Early examples of the partial identification concept include Frisch [1934], Fre´chet [1951]
and Duncan and Davis [1953]. In recent years, interest in partial identification has ac-
celerated; an excellent recent review article is Tamer [2010] which includes comprehensive
citations. See also the book-length treatments by Manski [Manski, 1995, 2003, 2007]. Recent
contributions from a Bayesian perspective have focused primarily on asymptotic properties
of the posterior distribution over partially identified parameters, notably Gustafson et al.
[2005] and Gustafson [2010]. Moon and Schorfheide [2012] examine asymptotic discrepancies
between Bayesian credible regions and frequentist confidence sets for set-identified parame-
ters. Florens and Simoni [2011] consider a theoretical framework for studying posteriors of
partially identified parameters in nonparametric models. Kline and Tamer [2013] develop
large sample approximations of posterior probabilities that particular parameter values lie
in the identified set without reference to a prior on the partially identified parameter.
Our approach differs from these recent contributions in three ways. One, it is tailored
to a nonlinear regression setting with possibly many predictors and complicated inter-
relationships; most of the recent literature considers much simpler examples, often without
any covariates. Two, our focus is on practical methods for making inferences on parameters
of interest with finite samples; most of the recent literature has focused on theoretical and
specifically large-sample issues. Three, we introduce an efficient computational scheme for
sensitivity analysis, an issue which has received relatively little attention in the literature.
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Most previous work focuses on wholly unidentified parameters and typically requires mul-
tiple iterations of model fitting; see e.g. McCandless et al. [2007], Molitor et al. [2009] and
McCandless et al. [2012] in the context of causal inference/observational data analysis, and
Daniels and Hogan [2008] and chapter 15 of Little and Rubin [2002] for extensive reviews in
missing data problems.
1.2. Application: inferring the prevalence of accounting misconduct. Since 1982,
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has released public notices
called Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, or AAERs. AAERs are financial
reports “related to enforcement actions concerning civil lawsuits brought by the Commission
in federal court and notices and orders concerning the institution and/or settlement of ad-
ministrative proceedings” [SEC, 2014]. Informally, AAERs comprise a list of publicly traded
firms that the SEC has cited for misconduct in one form or another.
For brevity, we adopt the nomenclature “cheating” and “caught”, with the understanding
that “cheating” is operationally defined as any accounting anomaly that would lead to an
AAER being issued, were it explicitly brought to the SEC’s attention. This interpretation
entails that no “caught” firms did not “cheat”, by definition.
Our goal is to provide an estimate of the prevalence of accounting misconduct in the U.S.
economy, defined as all actual (caught) and potential (uncaught) AAERs. Predicting which
companies are likely to cheat, on the basis of observable firm characteristics, is complicated
by the fact that there are potentially many instances of misconduct of which the SEC is
unaware. Thus, we do not directly observe which firms cheat, but merely the subset of
cheating firms that were caught doing so. A naive regression analysis would therefore only
speak to the question of which attributes are predictive of getting caught cheating. To
complete the analysis, one must incorporate knowledge or conjectures concerning the impact
firm attributes have on the likelihood of misconduct being discovered.
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2. Partially observable binary response vectors
Problems with a similar structure to our accounting application appear in the literature
under the heading of “partially observed binary data”. Regression models for such data have
been studied in many different fields, going by various names. For example, Lancaster and
Imbens [1996] considers the case where the observation model is covariate independent under
the name “contaminated case-control”, building on Prentice and Pyke [1979]. Poirier [1980]
studies such data under the rubric of “partially observed bivariate probit models”, building
on the work of Heckman [1976, 1978, 1979]. Our analysis is similar to the approach taken
in Wang [2013], which adapts the bivariate probit model of Poirier [1980] for the securities
fraud problem.
Whereas these earlier references considered particular parametric models, such as the
probit model, and studied identification conditions in that setting, we proceed in the more
generic setting of nonlinear regression models, which leads to partially identified parameters.
Our approach will be to confront this partial identification with informative priors.
2.1. Reparametrization in partially identified models. As in Dawid [1979], Gelfand
and Sahu [1999] and Gustafson et al. [2005], we will work with a reparameterization of τ into
an identified component φ and an unidentified component (θ, η). We write the unidentified
component as two parameters: θ, which appears in our estimand of interest, and η, which is
a nuisance parameter. We will refer to φ, φ(x) or φx (respectively, θ, θ(x) or θx and η, η(x)
or ηx) depending on context. We will use φ when the dependence on x is inessential, we will
use φ(x) to emphasize that φ is a function of x, and we will use φx to refer to point-wise
evaluations of φ(x).
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The joint distribution over data and parameters in a partially identified model can be
written as
pi(η, θ, φ, y) = f(y | η, θ, φ)pi(η, θ, φ),
= f(y | φ)pi(η, θ, φ),
= f(y | φ)pi(φ)pi(η, θ | φ),
(1)
where the conditional independence implied in moving from the first line to the second line
constitutes a definition of partial identification. It follows that the joint posterior distribution
of the identified component φ and the unidentified component (θ, η) can be written as
pi(η, θ, φ | y) = f(y | φ)pi(φ)pi(η, θ | φ)
f(y)
=
f(y | φ)pi(φ)
f(y)
pi(η, θ | φ)
= pi(φ | y)pi(η, θ | φ).
(2)
Theorem 5 of Kadane [1975] shows rigorously that the parameter space of any model can
be decomposed in this way. Essentially, there are three cases to consider. If the model is
fully identified, then (η, θ) is empty, meaning it is a degenerate/constant random variable.
When the model has fully unidentified elements, the support of pi(η, θ | φ) does not depend
on φ; the data inform about (η, θ) only via the presumed prior dependence represented in
the choice of pi(η, θ | φ). In the partially identified case, which we focus on here, pi(η, θ | φ)
has support restrictions that do depend on φ; we will denote this φ-dependent support by
Ω(φ).
Our approach will be to directly specify pi(η, θ | φ) with support Ω(φ). The tractability of
our approach depends on being able to construct pi(η, θ | φ) in a way that permits convenient
sampling. Our empirical analysis (Section 3.1.1) provides a specific example where this
approach is successful (with additional computational details in the appendix).
Although this type of reparameterization is not novel, it has been employed in the liter-
ature mainly as a way to study large sample behavior of posterior distributions in partially
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identified models; see, for example, Gustafson et al. [2005], Gustafson [2010] and Florens and
Simoni [2011]. Most authors suggest using priors on τ to induce the priors on (φ, θ), or sim-
ply elect to do indirect inference for θ using only φ by computing posteriors over Ω(φ). We
consider a different approach, working directly in the (φ, θ) parameterization and specifying
priors as pi(θ | φ)pi(φ). This allows us to be fully nonparametric where the data are informa-
tive (i.e., on φ), and exploit the conditional independence in (2) to conduct computationally
efficient sensitivity analysis.
2.2. Partially observed multivariate binary regression models. The general structure
of the problem is as follows: The complete data consist of binary vectors U = (U1, . . . Uk),
of which only certain subsets are simultaneously observable. Interest is in some functional
p(x) of the entire joint distribution p(U1, . . . Uk | x). Due to the partial observability, p(x)
must be reconstructed from an identified function φ(x) and an unidentified function θ(x).
Specializing to our corporate accounting analysis, let Zi indicate “cheating” in firm-year
i and let Wi indicate “getting caught” in firm-year i, (U1 = W and U2 = Z). We assume
that with some probability, cheaters get caught, but that there are no firms who get caught
when they are not cheating (this is consistent with our operational definition of “cheating”).
Additonally, the data are “presence-only” in that we have no confirmation that any given
firm is certainly non-cheating.
The parameter of interest is the marginal firm-year probability of cheating,
(3) p(x) = Pr(Z = 1 | x) = Pr(W = 1, Z = 1 | x)
Pr(W = 1 | Z = 1, x)
from which we may determine the overall prevalence of cheating across all firms as
(4) α ≡
∑
i
Pr(Zi = 1 | xi) =
∑
i
Pr(Zi = 1,Wi = 1 | xi)
Pr(Wi = 1 | Zi = 1, xi) .
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Equivalently, for each firm-year we observe Yi ≡ ZiWi instead of (Zi,Wi), where Yi indi-
cating whether a firm received an AAER (cheated and got caught), giving
(5) φ(x) = Pr(Z = 1,W = 1 | x) = Pr(Y = 1 | x); θ(x) = Pr(W = 1 | Z = 1, x).
As φ(x) is simply the (conditional) probability of the observed binary data Y , it is point
identified. In our application, we estimate φ(x) using the BART model described in the
Appendix. BART has been shown empirically to be an excellent default nonlinear regression
method, with a demonstrated ability to handle many noise variables and strong nonlinearities
[Chipman et al., 2010, Hill, 2012].
The partial identification of p(x) arises simply because 0 ≤ p(x) ≤ 1. Given φ(x), the
posterior on p(x) is defined by the prior over θ(x), truncated to regions satisfying
(6) 0 ≤ φ(x)
θ(x)
≤ 1,
for all x ∈ X . In other words, in our applied setting, Ω(φ(x)) = {θ(x) | φ(x) ≤ θ(x)}.
2.3. A Gaussian process model for the partially identified regression. Furnishing
prior information regarding θ(x) in a predictor-dependent manner strongly motivates the use
of simple parametric models. For starters, consider the construction
(7) F−1{θ(x)} = h(x)β,
where F−1 is a link function and h denotes some transformation or subset of the covariate
vector. A prior over θ(x) is induced by a prior over β. A chief difficulty with this type
of specification is that nonlinear (possibly discontinuous) regression models for φ(x) impose
complex support restrictions on β — indeed, some samples from the posterior for φ(x) may
contradict the model for θ(x) entirely, meaning that they imply a set of bounds for θ(x) such
that no feasible β exists.
To address this problem, we expand the prior over θ(x) to acknowledge that (7) is only a
guess as to the form of the regression function. Specifically, we center our model for θ(x) at
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(7) by assuming that
(8) F−1{θ(x)} | φ(x), η(x) ∼ GP (h(x)β,ΣX ) 1((θ(x), η(x)) ∈ Ω{φ(x)})
for all x ∈ X , where GP(m,ΣX ) is a Gaussian process with mean m and covariance ΣX . In
this set-up, β may be fixed or given a prior distribution, in which case we equate η := β.
For the purpose of computing α as in (4), the prior (8) applied to the observed data points
reduces to a multivariate normal prior (conditional on β) truncated according to (6). In our
empirical analysis, we choose ΣX = σ2I. Note that this independence is in terms of design
points, not in terms of observations: θxi = θxj if xi = xj, even if i 6= j. That is, draws
from the prior (8) are non-smooth functions, as distinct from observation-level errors. Under
this simplification, sampling from (θx | β, φx) reduces to drawing samples from independent
truncated univariate normal distributions. The more complicated case of a smooth Gaussian
process prior (e.g., one with a squared exponential covariance function) would require draws
from a multivariate truncated normal distribution; reasonably efficient Hamiltonian Monte
Carlo algorithms have been developed for this task [Pakman and Paninski, 2014] but we do
not pursue this direction here.
2.4. Simulated example. Before turning to the subject-specific prior we developed for our
empirical application, it is instructive to consider how our approach performs in a situation
where we know what the right answers ought to be. To this end, we consider a simulated
data set based on the competing approach of Wang [2013], which also analyzes the SEC
data.
Wang [2013] builds off Poirier [1980], which considers a latent Gaussian utility formulation
of the bivariate probit model:
(9)
Z∗
W ∗
 ∼ N(µ(x),Cρ)
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where µ(x) = (γ0 + x
tγ, β0 + x
tβ) and Cρ is a 2-by-2 correlation matrix with correlation
parameter ρ. The observed bivariate binary data is then Z := 1(Z∗ > 0) and W := 1(W ∗ >
0). Specifically, Poirier [1980] establishes that (subject to certain exclusion restrictions) the
parameters of the model (γ, β and the correlation parameter ρ) are still identified even when
only Y := ZW is observed. Wang [2013] proposes to leverage this result, while deviating
from the latent utility formulation. In particular, despite making a “no false positives”
assumption (as we do here), Wang [2013] continues to equate Pr(Z∗ > 0 | x) with the
probability of cheating, which corresponds to the somewhat arbitrary model:
Pr(cheat, caught) = Φ(γ0 + x
tγ, β0 + x
tβ, ρ)
Pr(cheat, not caught) = Φ(γ0 + x
tγ)− Φ(γ0 + xtγ, β0 + xtβ, ρ)
Pr(not cheat, caught) = 0
Pr(not cheat, not caught) = 1− Φ(γ0 + xtγ).
(10)
In other words, Wang [2013] identifies γ from the first equation above, invoking the result
of Poirier [1980], and then proceeds to interpret γ as the parameter from a bivariate probit
model without the no false positives assumption. While there is nothing formally wrong with
this model, it would seem to defy justification.
All the same, if (10) is in fact the correct model, it is instructive to observe what our
approach gives up to it. Conversely, if (10) is used in a misspecified setting, how do its results
compare to ours? To investigate, we simulated n = 2000 observations from the following two
models. First, we generated data according to (10) by drawing Y := WZ with (W,Z) coming
from a bivariate probit model with γ0 = β0 = −1/2, γ = (−1, 3/4, 0), β = (−3/4, 0,−1/2),
and ρ = 1/2, with x1 drawn from a Uniform(−pi/2, pi/2) distribution, and x2 and x3 drawn
from a Uniform(−3pi/2, 3pi/2) distribution (independently). This specification of γ and β
satisfies the exclusion restriction of Poirier [1980], in that distinct predictor variables are
omitted from each linear equation in the probit mean function.
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A Bayesian specification of Wang [2013], with vague conjugate priors for β and γ and a
uniform prior on (−1, 1) for ρ, was fit using a Gibbs sampler algorithm with a Metropolis-
Hastings update for ρ. Our modular prior approach proceeds by fitting the BART model
(with default priors as described in Chipman et al. [2010]) to the observed data (Yi, xi) and
constructing the posterior estimate of Pr(Zi | xi) by dividing posterior samples of φx by draws
of θx from (8), with diagonal covariance σ
2I with σ = 0.1 and mean function set to match the
true Pr(W = 1 | Z = 1) implied by (10). See the appendix for further computational details
regarding model fitting. The results are depicted in Figure 1. As expected, the Wang [2013]
model, which achieves point-identification when it is correctly specified, yields much more
accurate inference compared to our approach. Meanwhile, even with a correct surveillance
model in this case, there persists a modicum of unresolved uncertainty, which reflects that
in our model the estimand is only partially identified. Additionally, we see the impact of the
BART prior pulling the estimated probabilities towards 1/2 in regions near the edges where
there are fewer data points.
Our second demonstration deviates from the linear probit model by specifying µ(x) =
(0.5 + sin (x + pi)tβ, sin (x)tγ) for the same values of γ and β. The Wang [2013] model is
fit with the predictor variables unadjusted. The modular prior approach is fit the same as
before, using the correctly specified surveillance model. The results are depicted in Figure
2. As might be expected, under misspecification the Wang [2013] model badly mis-estimates
the true Pr(Zi = 1 | xi). Our approach, with good prior information, still does not achieve
point identification, but manages to avoid the gross mis-fit of the Wang [2013] model by
successfully recovering the nonlinear identified component from the data.
Naturally, if we had supplied invalid surveillance models, our approach may have been
far off the mark in both cases. The point of this demonstration is merely that proceeding
in a partially identified fashion is a more conservative course of action than choosing an
implausible model on the grounds that — should it happen to be correct — it would deliver
the desired point identification.
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Figure 1. Estimated probability of cheating versus the actual probability of
cheat on the normal linear predictor scale for each of n = 2000 data points.
Black solid dots show the modular prior approach, which loosely surrounds the
diagonal, demonstrating the unresolved uncertainty in the partial identification
approach. The solid gray dots correspond to the Wang [2013] model, which is
correctly specified in this example; they hew more tightly to the diagonal.
3. Analysis of AAER data, 2004-2010
Our data are aggregated from three main sources. First, the AAER response variable was
obtained from the Center for Financial Reporting and Management (CFRM) at Berkeley’s
Haas School of Business. Detailed information about the full data set can be found in Dechow
et al. [2011].
Second, additional firm attributes are obtained from the CompuStat North America An-
nual Fundamentals database via the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). These data
are then merged with the AAERs using Global Company Key (GVKEY) by year. Specifi-
cally, the covariates considered are:
• fiscal year,
• cash,
• net income,
• capital investments,
• SIC industry code,
• qui tam dummy variable.
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Figure 2. Estimated probability of cheating versus the actual probability of
cheat on the normal linear predictor scale for each of n = 2000 data points.
Black solid dots show the modular prior approach, which loosely surrounds the
diagonal, demonstrating the unresolved uncertainty in the partial identification
approach. The solid gray dots correspond to the Wang [2013] model, which is
incorrectly specified in this example; they grossly diverge from the diagonal.
Cash, net income and capital investments are all recorded as a fraction of the firm’s total
assets. Standard industrial classifications are given in terms of ten major divisions, denoted
A-J by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The qui tam dummy variable is
derived from the SIC codes; it denotes if a firm is in an industry where persons responsible for
revealing misconduct are eligible to receive some part of any award resulting from subsequent
prosecution. Similar to Dyck et al. [2008] and Jayaraman and Milbourn [2010], our qui
tam variable is set to one for firms with SIC code 381x, 283x, 37xx, 5122 or 80xx, which
includes healthcare providers and pharmaceutical firms, and airplane, missile, and tank
manufacturers. It is reasonable to suppose that firms in these industries have a greater
likelihood of any misconduct being exposed as a result of incentivized employees.
Finally, a keyword search at the Financial Times web page (www.ft.com) was conducted
on each company name and the number of search results was recorded by year. This variable
provides a crude measure of media exposure. Although discrepancies between firm names
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as recorded in CompuStat and firm names as reported in Financial Times articles lead to
measurement error of this variable, it still provides a reasonable proxy for name recognition
and cultural visibility. Most firms will never be mentioned in any news article; a few firms
are routinely mentioned in the press. To adjust for the fact that web traffic has increased
over that period, we normalize the search results count by the total number of hits across
all companies in a given year.
We restrict our analysis to U.S. firms who had positive net income for the given year,
considering the period between 2004 and 2010, for a total of 6, 641 unique firms and a total
of n = 25, 889 total firm-year observations.
3.1. Surveillance model. The unidentified function θ(x) can be thought of as a “surveil-
lance” probability; it encodes which attributes invite (discourage) SEC scrutiny, making
cheaters more (less) likely to be caught. Its effect is to inflate the probability of cheating,
which is intuitive since the proportion of caught cheaters φ(x) represents an obvious lower
bound on the proportion of actual cheaters.
Our surveillance model takes the form reported in expression (8) with ΣX = σ2I and
using a logit link. We scale and shift all variables to reside on the unit interval, taking
shifted log transformations of the financial times search hits and net income. We chose to
place nonzero coefficients on the (fiscal) year of misconduct, media exposure (as measured by
Financial Times search hits), income, cash, and a dummy for qui tam industries. We have
specific reasons to expect that these variables are important determinants of the surveillance
probability, allowing us to chose informative values for β.
First, note that the frequency of AAERs is substantially higher in earlier years; see Figure
3. AAERs may be filed retroactively, so the opportunity to discover and report misconduct in
a given year increases over time. Fitting a curve to the data in Figure 3 suggests a coefficient
βfyear = −2.5. Observe that this makes the posterior probability of cheating approximately
constant across the years examined, which seems plausible.
14
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Fiscal year
A
A
E
R
 ra
te
1%
2%
Figure 3. AAERs appear more common in more distant years, but this is
likely because they may be filed retroactively.
Second, it is reasonable to assume that media attention naturally draws SEC scrutiny
[Miller, 2006]. The SEC has a vested interest in catching and making examples of any
high-profile cheaters. We set βFThits = 2, implying approximately a six-fold difference in
the probability of misconduct being discovered between a company with no media exposure
and the company with the highest media exposure. Similarly, we set βquitam = 1, implying
approximately a two-fold increase in misconduct being discovered for companies in qui tam
industries where employees are incentivized to report misconduct.
These observations constitute the subjective information contained in our first observation
model (A). To determine the intercept term, consider the following argument: AAERs are
quite rare, with an aggregate incidence in our sample of only 0.5%. Potentially this is
because very few firms exhibit actionable misconduct, but more likely it is because the SEC
has limited resources to identify and pursue violations. Accordingly, one sensible calibration
method would be fix the mean probability of discovery across all firms. Fixing this quantity
and the other elements of β, we may then solve for the intercept β0. In the case of model A,
fixing the average discovery rate to 30% gives β0 = 0.
After obtaining posterior samples under model A, we observe that cash appears to have
a negative impact on the probability of cheating. In contrast, net income appears to have
a positive impact on the probability of cheating. We might surmise that these trends are
due to unadjusted surveillance probabilities. For example, one could argue that having large
amounts of cash on hand (relative to total assets) provides a measure of “wiggle room” that
15
Intercept Fiscal year FT.com hits cash net income qui tam
βA 0 −2.5 2 0 0 1
βB −0.85 −2.5 2 −1.50 2.5 1
Table 1. Regression coefficients defining surveillance models A and B. They
differ in their intercept terms and their cash and net income coefficients. The
intercepts have been adjusted to obtain an average misconduct discovery rate
of 30%
makes certain kinds of misconduct harder to discover. Likewise, firms with high income are
more likely to draw SEC attention than firms with smaller income streams. To compare our
results under these narratives, we specify a second surveillance model (B), with βcash = −1.5
and βincome = 2.5. Setting the intercept for model B to match the 30% discovery rate of
model A gives β0 = −0.85. Surveillance models A and B are shown side-by-side in Table 1.
3.1.1. Upper bounding cheating. Finally, we introduce an additional parameter c that allows
us to interject prior information concerning an upper bound on the probability of cheating.
Recall that the partial identification in this application is driven by the inequality Pr(Z =
1 | x) = φ(x)
θ(x) ≤ 1, which implies φ(x) ≤ θ(x); the left hand side of this latter inequality is
identified by the data. Extremely high probabilities of cheating are implausible, motivating
us to consider alternative truncations: Pr(Z = 1 | x) = φ(x)
θ(x) ≤ c, which implies φ(x)/c ≤ θ(x)
for c ≥ φ(x) for all x. Because φ(x) is identified, the data may contradict any particular
value of c by violating c ≥ φ(x) for some x. That is, η := c and Ω{φ(x)} = {(c, θ(x)) |
φ(x)/c ≤ θ(x) ≤ 1}. Note that η := c is “global” in that it implies inequalities across all
values of x, whereas θx can take distinct values at distinct x locations.
We specify pi(c | φ(x)) ∝ Beta (10c0, 10(1− c0)) 1{c ≥ supx φ(x)}. The prior mean c0
captures prior beliefs about the upper bound on Pr(Z = 1 | x), the probability of cheating
for any firm. This permits us to specify pi(θx | c, φX) ∝ N(h(x)β, σ2)1{θx ≥ φx/c}; joint
samples of (c, θx) are thereby guaranteed to lie in Ω(φx).
Our surveillance models allow us to include prior information in the form of subject matter
knowledge about the impact of various covariates. We are also able to include additional
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subjective prior information about
∑
i Pr(Wi = 1 | Zi = 1, xi) — the overall average proba-
bility of a cheating firm getting caught — via the intercept terms, and maxiPr(Zi = 1 | xi)
— an upper probability on any firm cheating — via the prior on c.
Further computational details are included in the Appendix.
3.2. Results. We conduct a sensitivity analysis by varying the parameters σ and c for
both model coefficients βA and βB above. Specifically, we consider two settings of each
(σ ∈ {0.25, 0.5} and c ∈ {0.4, 0.8}) for a total of eight candidate models. We study the
impact these choices have on both Pr(Z = 1 | x) as a function of individual predictor
variables, and also on the overall misconduct prevalence α.
Figure 4 shows the posterior distribution of the adjusted cheating prevalence under the
different models. As can be seen in the top panel, increasing σ or c alone has little effect
on the overall adjusted cheating prevalence. These two parameters control different aspects
of the surveillance uncertainty: a high c implies that any probability of cheating is plausi-
ble, whereas a high σ allows large deviations from the specified surveillance model logistic
term. Note that with the range of c and σ chosen, neither surveillance model yields overall
prevalence of misconduct greater than 15%.
The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows the posterior prevalence for each different SIC code
under the two priors, fixing (σ = 0.25, c = 0.4). Under both priors, SIC category D,
representing “electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply”, shows much lower cheating
prevalence than categories (B,E,H), which correspond to “mining and quarrying”, “water
supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities”, and “transportation and
storage” respectively.
Because BART is nonlinear, summary plots of the impact of individual covariates are
challenging to visualize, even if the surveillance model is relatively simple, such as our linear
logistic specification. It is instructive, therefore, to examine the implied probability of cheat-
ing as one varies individual covariates, for a given firm. That is, how does Pr(Z = 1 | x)
change as a function of xj while holding x−j fixed?
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Figure 4. Top panel: posterior cheating prevalence, white corresponding to
the raw (unadjusted) prevalence, pink to prior A and blue to prior B. The
four boxplots within each prior correspond to the following combinations for
c and σ (from left to right): (σ = 0.25, c = 0.4), (σ = 0.25, c = 0.8), (σ =
0.5, c = 0.4), (σ = 0.5, c = 0.8). Bottom panel: Posterior cheating prevalence
in companies within each SIC code, pink corresponding to prior A and blue to
prior B for (σ = 0.25, c = 0.4).
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To demonstrate this approach, we focus on a specific firm, ConAgra Foods of Omaha,
Nebraska (simply because it yields illustrative plots). Figure 5 shows Pr(Z = 1 | x), varying
media attention, cash, and net income under priors A and B and for various combinations
of c and σ. As expected, the surveillance model coefficients on cash and net income reverse
the associated slope of the probability of cheating. High values of both σ and c results
in posterior credible intervals of up to 40% probability of cheating for some values of net
income.
We have reported here only a small number of the possible variations one would presumably
want to investigate; we make no claims that models A and B are ideal or even necessarily
good or realistic models. Rather, our sensitivity analysis demonstrates a range of possible
comparisons that one might undertake when investigating how various assumptions interact
with the data via the identified portion of the model.
An important upshot of our analysis is that the surveillance model intercept terms—which
govern the average probability of misconduct discovery (getting caught) across firm—and the
parameter c— which defines the upper bound Pr(Zi = 1 | xi) ≤ c for all i — play dominant
roles in determining the inferred overall prevalence of misconduct. For our choices of 30%
misconduct discovery probability and c = 0.4 or c = 0.8, we find that no more than 15% of
firms engage in accounting misconduct.
Incidentally, this result is consistent with that of Dyck et al. [2013], who put the prevalence
at between 4.74% to 15%, based on a clever natural experiment resulting from the dissolution
of the large accounting firm Arthur Andersen and the subsequent re-audit of its clients
following the Enron scandal. Unavailability of their exact data, as well as the unavailability
of the data of Wang [2013] at the time of writing, means that we cannot compare their
precise estimates with those from our model. However, our partial identification analysis
suggests that any similar analysis is likely to yield similar conclusions in the matter of
overall prevalence. After all, there is only so much information in the available data, with
the rest coming from auxiliary assumptions about the surveillance probability, whether those
assumptions are explicit, as in our model, implicit, as in the joint likelihood assumed by Wang
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[2013], or based on supplementary evidence, as in Dyck et al. [2013]. To the extent that
these various approach supply similar assumptions, they will yield similar conclusions. Our
approach, by layering such assumptions over the data ex post, permits systematic sensitivity
analysis rather than one-off comparisons of published studies whose authors are committed
to one particular approach.
4. Discussion
Working directly with modular priors in partially identified settings has several advan-
tages. First, it allows identified parameters to be modeled flexibly, permitting the data to
be maximally informative, while simultaneously allowing the analyst to specify informative
priors for the underidentified components of the model. It may appear that this tactic stands
in contrast to the approach of Gustafson [2010] (for example) which advocates working with
a scientific model directly in the τ parametrization. However, nothing in our approach
precludes the use of such subject-specific information. Rather, we argue that typical prior
specifications for τ do not allow separately modulating the prior informativeness on the
identified and unidentified components; by working directly in the (φ, θ) representation, we
achieve precisely this sort differential informativeness. Nonetheless, one should always be
mindful of the implied prior on τ . Specifically, analysts can use intuitions regarding τ as a
tool for vetting priors over (φ, θ), by checking (via simulation) that they are consistent with
available knowledge in the τ representation. In many applications, such as the one studied in
this paper, the (φ, θ) representation is itself readily interpretable (in this case, the “cheating
probability” and the “surveillance probability”, respectively).
Second, when an interpretable parameterization of the modular parameters is available (as
it is in our application), the modular prior approach facilitates efficient sensitivity analyses.
Sensitivity analysis is good practice generally, and vital when the data are completely unin-
formative about certain aspects of the model. Being able to conduct such analyses without
refitting the entire model can be a tremendous practical advantage, particularly when fitting
sophisticated nonlinear regression models to the identified component.
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Figure 5. Pr(Z = 1 | x) varying xj while holding x−j fixed (at the values of
ConAgra Foods) under two surveillance models A (pink) and B (blue). Lines
depict the median and shaded areas depict 90% credibility intervals. Each row
represents a different covariate; the three columns correspond to the following
(c, σ) combinations (from left to right): (c = 0.4, σ = 0.25), (c = 0.8, σ =
0.25), (c = 0.8, σ = 0.5).
Finally, while we have not emphasized it in our applications, our use of modular priors
allows us to not only conduct sensitivity analyses, but also perform model checking on
the unidentified component. By computing “residuals” for our model of θ(x) based on the
support function Ω{φ(x)} we can learn about areas in the covariate space where our prior
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model is contradicted by the data—that is, regions where the model places significant mass
outside Ω{φ(x)}. This is a unique opportunity in partially identified models that, to our
knowledge, has not been exploited in the existing literature. Performing these model checks
in our applications did not raise any red flags, but they would indicate potential problems
in situations such as our example in section 2.4.
We expect these methods to be useful in other contexts with partially observed data,
including traditional missing data settings (nonignorable unit or item survey nonresponse,
dropout, or measurement error) [Rubin, 1976, Little and Rubin, 2002, Daniels and Hogan,
2008], causal inference with observational data or imperfectly randomized study designs [Im-
bens and Rubin, 1997b, Barnard et al., 2003, Greenland, 2005, McCandless et al., 2007, 2012],
and ecological inference [Duncan and Davis, 1953, Phillips Shively, 1969, Achen and Shively,
1995, King, 2013], to name just a few. Our approach allows practitioners to consider much
more sophisticated regression modeling for identified parameters while taking a principled
approach to the lack of identification, and promotes the routine use of sensitivity analysis
and model checking due to the ease with which they are implemented. For an illustration
of our approach applied to an imperfectly randomized study of flu vaccine efficacy, see the
supplementary material.
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Appendix A. Bayesian additive regression trees
In our application, the nonlinear function φ(x) was modeled using the Bayesian Additive
Regression Trees (BART) approach of Chipman et al. [2010]. Though nothing in our method
is specific to this choice, the BART model has several properties that make it a sensible
choice. BART is more flexible than classical parametric regression models, such as linear
logistic or probit regression [Cox, 1958], but, unlike alternative nonparametric Bayesian
regression models, BART is able to detect interactions and discontinuities and is invariant
to monotone transformations of the covariates. For clarity, in this appendix we keep to the
original notation used in Chipman et al. [2010]; several of the BART prior parameter names
are used in the main text where they refer to different entities.
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Figure 6. (Left) An example binary tree, with internal nodes labelled by their
splitting rules and terminal nodes labelled with the corresponding parameters
µlb (Right) The corresponding partition of the sample space and the step
function.
The BART prior represents an unknown function f(x) as a sum of many piecewise constant
binary regression trees. Each tree Tl, 1 ≤ l ≤ L, consists of a set of internal decision nodes
which define a partition of the covariate space (say A1, . . . ,AB(l)), as well as a set of terminal
nodes or leaves — one corresponding to each element of the partition. Each subset of the
partition Ab is associated with a parameter value µlb, defining a piecewise constant function:
gl(x) = µlb if x ∈ Ab. This regression tree function representation is depicted in Figure 6.
Individual regression trees are then additively combined into a single regression function:
f(x) =
∑L
l=1 gl(x). The representation of f(x) through the sum of a set of regression trees is
generally non-unique; in our applications, this redundancy is unproblematic.
Each of the functions gl are constrained by their prior to be “weak learners”; that is,
the prior strongly favors small trees and leaf parameters that are near zero. Each tree
independently follows the prior described by Chipman et al. [1998], where the probability
that a node at depth d splits (is not terminal) is given by α(1+d)−β, α ∈ (0, 1), β ∈ [0,∞).
A variable to split on, and a cut-point to split at, are then selected uniformly at random
from the available splitting rules. Large, deep trees are given extremely low prior probability
by taking α = 0.95 and β = 2 as in Chipman et al. [2010]. The leaf parameters are
assigned independent priors µlb ∼ N(0, σ2µ) where σµ = 3/(k
√
L). The default value,
k = 2, shrinks gl(x) strongly toward zero. The induced prior for f(x) is centered at zero and
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puts approximately 95% of the prior mass within ±3 pointwise. Larger values of k imply
increasing degrees of shrinkage.
Finally, the probability function of interest is modeled as Φ (f(x) + c), where c is an offset
parameter and Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Complete
details of the BART prior and its implementation are given by Chipman et al. [2010].
A.1. Computation. Posterior inferences are obtained by sampling at a fixed grid of design
points x∗1, . . . , x
∗
J . To reduce notational clutter, we suppress dependence on x
∗
j ; for example,
θ should be read as referring to a specific θ(x∗j).
Operationally, posterior samples are obtained according to the following recipe.
(1) Fit the BART model to the observed pairs (Yi, xi), for i = 1, . . . , n. Convenient R
implementations facilitate this step readily, for example BayesTree or dbarts. This
gives a collection of posterior samples φ1, . . . , φk.
(2) For each posterior sample φk, draw θk by first drawing ηk from pi(ηk | φk)1{ηk ∈
Ω[φk]} and then drawing θk from pi(θk | φk, ηk)1{θk, ηk ∈ Ω[φk]}.
See Chan and Tobias [2014] for a similar computational approach. Because sampling from
the posterior of φ operates independently from sampling the partially identified parameter
θ — as shown in (2) in the main text — sensitivity analysis can be conducted without ever
needing to refit the model, simply by repeating step 2 for various choices of pi(η, θ | φ).
In our empirical application, we use the Gaussian process prior (8) with diagonal covariance
matrix, η := c is given a Beta prior as described in Section 3.1.1, and we use a standard
normal probit link for F−1. For these choices, step 2 above becomes:
(i) Draw c from its truncated Beta distribution with lower truncation point given by
max {φ(x∗1), . . . , φ(x∗J)}.
(ii) Draw F−1{θx} from independent truncated normal distributions at each design point,
with lower bound F−1{φx/c}.
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Appendix B. Supplementary Application: Randomized encouragement study
of flu vaccine
Our data come from a randomized encouragement study of the effectiveness of an influenza
vaccine conducted at an academic primary care practice affiliated with a large teaching
hospital in an urban setting [McDonald et al., 1991]. Physicians were randomly assigned
to treatment or control groups, with treated physicians receiving a computerized reminder
about the vaccine when a patient with a scheduled visit also met the U.S. Public Health
Service Criteria for receiving a flu vaccine. Patients were eligible for the vaccine if they
were 65 or older, or if they had certain severe chronic diseases including chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (COPD). The outcome of interest is subsequent hospitalization for flu-
related illness, and the covariates include the patient’s age and COPD status. Hirano et al.
[2000] conduct a Bayesian analysis of this problem, placing a default joint prior over all
the identified and unidentified parameters. In this application we perform an alternative
selectively informative analysis with modular priors. We will use the terms “reminder”,
“instrument” and “encouragement” interchangably here, prefering “reminder” in the context
of the specific applied problem.
B.1. Causal Inference in a Binary Instrumental Variables Model. Let Zi, Ti, and
Yi be the observed values of the treatment assignment (or encouragement, or instrument),
treatment received, and outcome for observation i, respectively. Let Xi be a vector of baseline
covariates. In the flu data, Zi = 1 if encouragement (the reminder) was administered,
Ti = 1 if the vaccine was administered, and Yi = 1 if the patient was not hospitalized.
As in Angrist et al. [1996] and Hirano et al. [2000] define the potential outcomes Ti(z) and
Yi(t, z) as the treatment assignment that would have been observed had we fixed Zi = z and
the outcome we would have observed fixing Ti = t, Zi = z, respectively. We will suppress
indexing by i for population quantities. We make the stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA) [Angrist et al., 1996], i.e. that there is no interference between units and no
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T (1) T (0) S (Compliance Type)
0 0 Never Taker (n)
1 1 Always Taker (a)
1 0 Complier (c)
0 1 Defier (d)
Table 2. Compliance types, or principal strata, defined by response patterns
across levels of Z.
alternative versions of treatment. 1 Mathematically, SUTVA implies that Ti(z) = Ti(zi)
and Yi(t, z) = Yi(ti, zi), where z, t are vectors of instrument/encouragement assignment and
treatments received (respectively) for the entire sample.
In this application the complete vector of binary response variables is
(11) Ui = (Ti(0), Ti(1), Yi(0, 0), Yi(0, 1), Yi(1, 0), Yi(1, 1))
′,
the collection of treatments and outcomes under all possible experimental conditions. How-
ever, we observe only Ti ≡ Ti(Zi) and Yi ≡ Yi(Ti(Zi), Zi), where Zi is randomly assigned at
the study outset. We can define compliance types or principal strata S based on the possible
values for (T (1), T (0)) – see Table 2. We will assume that the encouragement Z is ignorable
or randomly assigned (as it is in the flu data). We also assume that there are no defiers
(“monotonicity of compliance”), i.e., Pr(S = d | x) = 0. In the current setting a defier would
be a patient who would only receive the vaccine if the reminder was not administered, which
is quite unlikely.
Let pis(x) = Pr(S = s | x) and γtzs (x) = Pr(Y (t, z) = 1 | S = s, x) denote the principal
strata and potential outcome probability models. Under the above assumptions the potential
outcome and principal strata distributions are linked to the joint distribution of observables
1Hirano et al. [2000] point out that in an infectious disease application with individuals as the unit of random-
ization this assumption is unlikely to hold exactly, but constitutes a reasonable first order approximation.
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by the following equations.
Pr(T = 1 | Z = 0, x) = pia(x),(12)
Pr(T = 1 | Z = 1, x) = pic(x) + pia(x),(13)
Pr(Y = 1 | T = 0, Z = 0, x) = [pic(x)γ00c (x) + pin(x)γ00n (x)]/[pic(x) + pin(x)],(14)
Pr(Y = 1 | T = 1, Z = 1, x) = [pic(x)γ11c (x) + pia(x)γ11a (x)]/[pic(x) + pia(x)],(15)
Pr(Y = 1 | T = 0, Z = 1, x) = γ01n (x),(16)
Pr(Y = 1 | T = 1, Z = 0, x) = γ10a (x).(17)
Richardson and Robins [2010] derive this mixture relationship between principal strata/potential
outcome distributions and the observable joint in detail under a range of assumptions about
the latent variables (see also Imbens and Rubin [1997a] and Richardson et al. [2011]).
The probabilities on the left hand side completely determine the joint distribution of
observables (Y and T given Z) and hence constitute a basis for φ. Clearly pi, γ01n and γ
10
a
are one-to-one maps from φ, and are point identified as well. However, γ00c , γ
00
n , γ
11
c , and
γ11a are not. For example, at any point in covariate space γ
11
c (x) and γ
11
a (x) must lie on the
line segment given by the intersection of the line in equation (15) and [0, 1]× [0, 1], but the
data are wholly uninformative about their position on that line segment. In particular, the
range of γ11a (x) is
(18)
(
min
(
0,
pia(x) + pic(x)
pia(x)
p1|11(x)− pic(x)
pia(x)
)
, max
(
1,
pia(x) + pic(x)
pia(x)
p1|11(x)
))
where p1|11(x) = Pr(Y = 1 | T = 1, Z = 1, x). The situation is exactly the same for γ00c (x)
and γ00n (x), with the line given by (14) and bounds similar to (18) (large sample bounds
on causal effects within principal strata were introduced by Zhang and Rubin [2003]; see
Richardson et al. [2011] for bounds under monotonicity and other assumptions, as well as
further references).
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Point identification for the remaining parameters is often obtained through further assump-
tions on the distribution of the potential outcomes. The stochastic exclusion restriction for
compliance type s posits that there is no direct effect of Z on Y ; that is, γi0s = γ
i1
s for i = 0, 1
[Hirano et al., 2000]. From (12)-(17) it is clear that this achieves point identification for the
entire distribution of the potential outcomes.
Hirano et al. [2000] anticipated failures of the exclusion restrictions, noting that a reminder
about flu shots might also prompt physicians to counsel patients about other preventative
measures to avoid contracting the flu. They propose relaxing the exclusion restrictions and
resolving the resulting nonidentifiability through prior probability modeling. In this sense
our approach and theirs are philosophically similar, but our framework affords us significant
flexibility in choosing the model for φ while transparently embedding prior information about
θ, which is difficult to do in their modeling setup. In our subsequent analysis we will avoid
imposing any exclusion restrictions.
B.2. Model Specification. Our model for observables decomposes into a treatment model
and an outcome given treatment model, i.e., P (Y, T | Z, x) = P (T | Z, x)P (Y | T, Z, x).
We assign each of these a probit BART prior. For the treatment model, randomization of
treatment assignment and monotonicity of compliance imply that Pr(T = 1 | Z = 1, x) ≥
Pr(T = 1 | Z = 0, x) for all x (see equations (12) and (13)). We enforce this constraint
by rejecting samples from BART where this condition fails at any point in covariate space.
More elaborate approaches to enforcing monotonicity are possible but beyond the scope of
the present paper.
B.2.1. Partially identified parameters. Recall that we have two pairs of unidentified param-
eters, (γ00c , γ
00
n ) and (γ
11
c , γ
11
a ). Fixing one element of each pair would solve the identification
problem, so we can take θ = (γ00n , γ
11
a ) without loss of generality. This is in contrast to
Hirano et al. [2000], who specify a strongly parametric probability model for all four of the
unidentified parameters.
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We consider three priors on θ. All three are of the form
(19) (logit{γ00n (x)}, logit{γ11a (x)})′ = µ{φ(x)}+ h(x)β + (x).
with µ(φ(x)) = (logit{γ01n (x)}, logit{γ10a (x)})′, h(x) = 1 and β = (ba,−bn). This centers
our prior at a proportional odds model, where the reminder increases the odds of a positive
outcome by a factor of exp(ba) or exp(bn) in always or never takers (respectively) at any
covariate value. A natural way to complete this prior is to take bs ∼ N(0, σ2s) for s = a, n
which centers the prior at the exclusion restrictions and expresses prior beliefs about plausible
effect sizes through σ2s . For illustration we take σs = 0.1 or 0.25 for the current application.
Hirano et al. [2000] estimate principal strata-independent total effects of COPD around -0.35
on the log odds scale, so the more diffuse prior covers a plausible range of possible effect
sizes for the direct effect of a reminder within non-compliers. We would expect any direct
beneficial effect of the reminder on the subsequent hospitalization to be smaller than the
detrimental effect of a serious chronic disease like COPD purely on substantive grounds.
In the flu application we also have some prior information about likely effect directions,
which we can also incorporate in the prior. Any direct effect from the reminder is most
likely to be positive, since the reminder probably encourages doctors and patients to take
other preventative measures beyond the vaccine. Additionally, Hirano et al. [2000] speculate
that the exclusion restriction for never takers is more plausible than for always takers since
perceived risk is a key driver of compliance behavior, with low-risk patients more likely to
be never takers. A more nuanced view is that the direct effect should be larger for always
takers than never takers — even though never takers probably have lower risk on average,
we should not rule out the possibility of high-risk never takers who refuse the vaccine due
to cost, safety or other concerns.
A prior for θ that reflects these beliefs is (ba, bn) ∼ N(b0,Σb)1(ba > 0, bn > 0). For the
analysis in the sequel we will take b0 = (0.05, 0.0)
′, Σb = diag(0.132, 0.052). In additional
simulations we find that results are insensitive to plausible values of Cov(ba, bn). These
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particular numerical values were chosen The prior mode is b0, the prior mean is about
(0.125, 0.04), and the marginal 90th percentile is about 0.25 for ba and 0.08 for bn. The prior
scale for ba is calibrated so that (with high probability) ba is smaller in magnitude than the
effect of COPD on the hospitalization as reported by Hirano et al. [2000] (the posterior mean
was generally around -0.35, SD 0.15). We will call this the “informed” prior. For all three
priors we set v = 0.025.
B.3. Results. We fit the model described in the previous section to the flu vaccine data,
using age and COPD as covariates. Figure 7 shows the probability of belonging to each
principal stratum as a function of age and COPD along with marginal 90% credible intervals.
We find a fairly sharp break in compliance behavior at age 65 (the probability of being a
never-taker drops, and seems to be shifted largely to always takers), which appears to hold
regardless of COPD status. Possible explanations include patients or providers giving more
weight to age-based vaccination guidelines, or better insurance coverage and increased access
to services in the older cohort.
Figure 8 shows the outcome distributions by age, COPD, and the treatment assigned and
received. There is clear evidence of an age/COPD interaction; this is due at least in part to
the study design, where all participants under 65 have at least one chronic disease (possibly
COPD). This also means that the 65+ population is on average less likely to he hospitalized
than the younger cohort, explaining the seemingly paradoxical decrease in the estimated
probability of hospitalization at age 65 in the “No COPD” group.
B.3.1. Causal effects. We are primarily interested in (partially identified) sample causal
effects. As in Hirano et al. [2000] we will consider estimating the intention-to-treat (ITT)
effect in each principal stratum:
(20) ITTs =
1
ns
∑
i:Si=s
(Yi(Ti(1), 1)− Yi(Ti(0), 0)).
where ns is the number of observations with compliance type S. Given a sample from the
marginal distribution for φ, and a sample from θ, we can impute each observation’s missing
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Figure 8. Log odds of a positive outcome (no hospitalization) by age, COPD,
and treatment assignment/receipt
principal strata membership and the unobserved potential outcome. With the completed
data it is straightforward to compute the sample ITT effects. Computational details are
provided in Appendix C
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We compare results under our three priors to three models from Hirano et al. [2000]: the
model with no exclusion restrictions (“none”), both exclusion restrictions (“both”), or the
never-taker exclusion restriction (“n”). The “Hirano (none)” model has very wide standard
deviations, which are driven by their use of diffuse, “off-the-shelf” priors. Their marginal
prior for the direct effect of the reminder is approximately normal with mean zero and
standard deviation 1.5, which puts significant prior probability on implausible values such
as large and/or negative direct effects. Such vague priors are inappropriate for partially
identified parameters.
In contrast, the BART models all give similar results. The “BART (0.1)” and “BART
(0.25)” models differ mainly in the width of the posterior standard errors, and then only
slightly. The “BART (0.25)” model assumes that with high probability the magnitude of
any direct effect on the log odds is within ±0.5 – compare this to the COPD effect, which
is estimated to increase the log odds of hospitalization by about 0.35. The “informed” prior
restricts the population effects to be positive but small, which tends to shrink the ITTc effect
toward zero – the overall ITT effect is identified, so positive effects in the other principal
strata lead necessarily to smaller ITTc estimates than unrestricted models.
The substantive conclusion is largely unchanged: there is only modest evidence for the
effectiveness of the vaccine, particularly if we assume the direct effect of the reminder is sim-
ilar in always-takers and compliers. This is unsurprising given the sample size of n = 2, 861,
weakness of the encouragement (Fig. 7), and relative rarity of the outcome (about 8% of the
study participants were hospitalized). However, unlike Hirano et al. [2000] we conclude that
the ITTc effect is actually fairly robust to plausible deviations from the exclusion restrictions.
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Figure 9. Posterior mean and standard deviations for the sample ITT ef-
fects in each principal stratum. “BART (0.1)” and “BART (0.25)” use the
conditional prior centered at the exclusion restrictions with σa = σn = 0.1
or 0.25, respectively. “BART (informed)” includes all prior information. The
“Hirano” models are from Hirano et al. [2000]; the “n” model assumes the
exclusion restriction in never-takers, the “both” model imposes both exclusion
restrictions and the “none” model has no exclusion restrictions.
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Appendix C. Imputing principal strata membership, potential outcomes, and
ITT effects
The full conditional distribution of principal strata membership is given by
Pr(Si = a | Yi = y, Ti = t, Zi = z,Xi = x, φ, θ) ∝ piA(x)γ11a (x)y(1− γ11a (x))1−y1(Zi = Ti = 1)
(21)
Pr(Si = n | Yi = y, Ti = t, Zi = z,Xi = x, φ, θ) ∝ piN(x)γ00n (x)y(1− γ00n (x))1−y1(Zi = Ti = 0)
(22)
Pr(Si = c | Yi = y, Ti = t, Zi = z,Xi = x, φ, θ) ∝ piC(x)γtzc (x)y(1− γtzc (x))1−y1(Zi = Ti)
(23)
Note that observations with Zi = 1, Ti = 0 (Zi = 0, Ti = 1) are never takers (always takers)
with probability one, and observations with Ti = Zi = 1 (Ti = Zi = 0) are either compliers
or always takers (never takers).
Finally, given an observation’s PS membership, the missing potential outcome is sampled
from its full conditional, which is just
Pr(Yi(t, 1− z) = 1 | Ti = t, Zi = z,Xi = x, Si = s, φ, θ) = γt(1−z)s (x).
The ITT effects can be computed from the completed data using the following alternative
expressions:
ITTc =
∑n
i=1 1(Si = c)[Zi{Yi − Yi(0, 0)}+ (1− Zi){Yi(1, 1)− Yi}]∑n
i=1 1(Si = c)
(24)
ITTn =
∑n
i=1 1(Si = n)[Zi{Yi − Yi(0, 0)}+ (1− Zi){Yi(0, 1)− Yi}]∑n
i=1 1(Si = n)
(25)
ITTc =
∑n
i=1 1(Si = a)[Zi{Yi − Yi(1, 0)}+ (1− Zi){Yi(1, 1)− Yi}]∑n
i=1 1(Si = a)
(26)
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